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What Drives the Stock Market Comovements between 
Korea and China, Japan and the U.S.? 
By Jinsoo Lee and Bok-Keun Yu* 
This paper measures the extent of comovements in stock returns 
between Korea and three major countries (China, Japan and the U.S.) 
using industry-level data for Korea from 2003 to 2016 in the spirit of 
the international capital asset pricing model. It also examines what 
drives the comovements between Korea and the three countries. We 
find that the comovements of Korean stock returns with those of the 
U.S. and Japan became smaller after the global financial crisis. In 
contrast, the comovement in stock returns between Korea and China 
became larger after the crisis. After an additional analysis, we 
conclude that trade linkage is the main driver of the comovements 
between Korea and the three countries. 
Key Word: Stock Market Comovement, Trade Linkage, 
Financial Linkage 
JEL Code: F15, F21, G15 
 
 
  I. Introduction 
 
he Korean stock market has shown a high degree of comovement with the 
stock markets of select major countries, which may reflect the increasing real 
linkage as well as more financial integration with those countries. It is also 
intriguing that the extent of this comovement has changed over time and that the 
degree of change appears to differ for different countries. For example, comparing 
the period before the global financial crisis with the post-crisis period, the 
correlations of Korean stock market returns with those of China and the U.S. rose, 
whereas the stock market comovement between Korea and Japan decreased.1 In 
this paper, motivated by these observations, we examine the factors that drive the 
stock market comovements between Korea and three major countries (China, Japan 
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1The correlation coefficients of Korea-China, Korea-Japan and Korea-U.S. stock market returns using weekly 
data from Datastream are 0.49, 0.59 and 0.47, respectively, for the period of 2003-2007. However, the coefficients 
are 0.69, 0.49 and 0.60, respectively, for the period of 2010-2016. 
T
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and the U.S.).
To undertake this task, we initially measure the comovements in stock returns 
between 24 Korean manufacturing industries and the three countries using a model 
in the spirit of the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), where the 
expected return of a country’s stock market is influenced by global stock market 
returns. Specifically, we use the market returns of the three major countries as 
proxies for global stock market returns, and the stock returns for Korean 
manufacturing industries are related to the market returns of the three countries. In 
our model, the degrees of the comovements between Korean manufacturing 
industries and the three countries are measured using the slope coefficients (betas) 
of the three countries for these industries. 
Next, we examine the driver(s) of the comovements between Korean manufacturing 
industries and the three countries. According to conventional financial theory, the 
price of a security can be modelled as the present value of future cash flows from 
the security, with the future cash flows being discounted at appropriate discount 
rates. If this is the case, the degree of commonality between securities may come 
from two sources: (i) comovement in cash flows (real linkage) and (ii) comovement 
in discount rates (financial linkage). In this paper, as proxies for the two sources of 
comovement, we use the ratio of trade to sales for the real linkage and the share of 
foreign stock investment for the financial linkage.  
From our analysis, we find that the comovements of the Korean stock market 
with those of the U.S. and Japan were diminished after the global financial crisis. 
In contrast, the post-crisis comovement in stock returns between Korea and China 
is greater than that of the pre-crisis period. With the two proxies for real and 
financial linkages, we find that the trade-to-sales ratio is positively related to the 
degree of comovements in stock returns between Korea and the three countries. On 
the other hand, we find no evidence that financial linkage proxied by foreign stock 
investment is related to comovements in stock returns between Korea and the three 
countries. 
There are previous studies such as Forbes and Chinn (2004), Elekdag et al. 
(2012) and Arslanalp et al. (2016) where a two-stage factor model similar to that 
used here is employed in order to study linkages in financial markets across 
countries. These studies use aggregate and macro-level data for their sample 
countries and thus variations in the linkages and related determinants at the country 
level. In contrast, our study uses industry-level data for an individual country, in 
this case Korea. As there are cross-sectional variations as well as time-series 
variations across industries, we can use such variations in order to examine this 
issue for an individual country in more depth with industry-level data. In this 
regard, we expect that our study at the industry level for an individual country will 
complement previous studies at the country level for groups of countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we explain trade and 
stock market trends in Korea. We provide a review of the literature in Section III. 
In Section IV, we describe the data and introduce the methodology used for our 
analysis. We report the empirical results of our analysis in Section V. We conclude 
the paper in Section VI. 
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II. Trade and Stock Market Trends in Korea 
 
Korea’s trade (exports plus imports) appears to reflect the overall conditions of 
the global economy as well as its evolvement. Figure 1 shows the shares of exports, 
imports and trade in Korea’s GDP from 2003 to 2016. The trade share continued to 
rise until 2008, mainly on the back of the favorable global economy. However, it 
declined sharply in 2009 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. From 2010, 
it increased again, reaching 96%, the highest ratio, in 2011. It has been falling since 
2012, possibly due to sluggish investment given the delayed global economic 
recovery from the crisis. The share of trade in GDP was 65% as of 2016, similar to 
the level in 2007. 
Both exports and imports show similar trends. In 2016, the share of exports and 
imports in GDP was 37% and 28%, respectively. As shown in Figure 1, the trade 
surplus (exports – imports) has increased since the crisis, mainly due to decreased 
commodity prices and strong exports of Korea’s flagship products such as 
semiconductors and automobiles. 
Figure 2 shows the shares of exports, imports and trade with the three major 
trading partners of Korea (the U.S., Japan and China) for the period from 2003 to 
2016. In the case of the U.S., the shares of exports and imports continued to decline 
until 2011. The uptrend in recent years is presumably due to the Korea-U.S. FTA, 
which came into effect on March 15, 2012. For Japan, both the export and import 
shares showed declining trends throughout the period. As of 2016, the share of 
imports was 11.7%, whereas the share of exports was 4.9%. In the case of China, in 
contrast to the U.S. and Japan, the trends in the shares of exports and imports both 
increased. The shares of exports and imports were 25.1% and 21.4% in 2016, 
accounting for the largest portion among Korea’s trade partners. Consequently, the 
share for China in Korea’s trade is much higher than those of the U.S. and Japan, 
 
 
FIGURE 1. SHARES OF EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE IN KOREA’S GDP 
Note: Data are based on nominal amounts, goods and Korean won standards. 
Source: Bank of Korea (ECOS). 
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reaching 23.4% in 2016. This indicates that China may become a more dominant 
player in Korea’s trade dynamics and thus may have a greater impact on the 
Korean economy than before, both in real and financial terms. 
 
[Panel A: Exports] 
 [Panel B: Imports] 
 [Panel C: Trade] 
 
FIGURE 2. SHARES OF KOREA’S EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE WITH THE U.S., JAPAN AND CHINA 
Note: Data are based on nominal amounts, goods and U.S. dollar standards. 
Source: Bank of Korea (ECOS). 
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The Korean stock market has continued to advance together with the growth of 
the real economy in Korea. Figure 3 presents the ratio of market capitalization2 to 
GDP and the share of foreign ownership of the stock market in Korea. The ratio of 
market capitalization to GDP rose from 48% in 2003 to 101% in 2007. During the 
crisis, the ratio plunged to 56% in 2008. The ratio then resumed its increase before 
leveling off at around 90%. On the other hand, the foreign-owned share of stocks in 
Korea approached 40% in both 2003 and 2004, after which it declined gradually to 
27% in 2008. It increased afterwards, reaching 32% in 2016, but it still remains 
lower than in 2003. Figure 4 reports the shares of foreign investors from the U.S., 
 
 
FIGURE 3. MARKET CAPITALIZATION/GDP AND FOREIGN-OWNED SHARE 
IN THE KOREAN STOCK MARKET 
Note: Market capitalization is measured by KOSPI plus KOSDAK. 
Source: Bank of Korea (ECOS), Koscom and Financial Supervisory Services. 
 
 
FIGURE 4. SHARES HELD BY THE U.S., JAPAN AND CHINA IN THE KOREAN STOCK MARKET 
Note: The equity ratio was determined according to the stock and investment fund shares. 
Source: IMF (Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey). 
 
2Market capitalization refers to the total market value of outstanding shares for a company and is computed 
by multiplying the outstanding shares of the company by the market price of a share. The market capitalization of 
a country is computed as the sum of the market capitalizations for individual companies. 
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Japan and China. As of 2016, the U.S. accounted for 49%, whereas the shares of 
Japan and China were only 3% and less than 1%, respectively. The U.S. portion has 
been much larger than those of Japan and China throughout the entire period. This 
implies an outsized influence of U.S. investors on the Korean stock market relative 
to those of the other two countries. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
Our paper generally follows the methodology used by Forbes and Chinn (2004), 
Elekdag et al. (2012), and Arslanalp et al. (2016). Forbes and Chinn (2004) 
investigate how trade and financial linkages between five major countries (France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S.) and 38 sample countries affect 
comovements in stock and bond market returns from 1986 to 2000. First, they 
estimate the impacts of bilateral, global and sectoral factors on each country’s asset 
returns using a factor model.3 In the second stage, the bilateral factor loadings, also 
known as “betas,” are regressed on the trade-related and financial variables of trade 
flows, trade competition in third markets, bank lending and foreign investment. 
The authors find that trade linkage variables are more significant than financial 
variables in the explanation of the factor loadings.  
Elekdag et al. (2012) analyze the evolution of stock market linkages between 
five major economies (France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S.) and 12 Asian 
countries4 during the period of 1992-2011. They document that the degree of 
financial sensitivity of the Asian countries to the major economies increased, with 
both trade and financial linkages as the key determinants. They also argue that 
certain macroeconomic policies the Asian countries, such as reductions in 
government debt and increases in foreign reserves, made limited contributions to 
mitigating these levels.  
Arslanalp et al. (2016) explore comovements in stock markets between Asian 
countries and four major economic blocks (China, Japan, the euro area, and the 
U.S.). They build a two-stage model based on Forbes and Chinn (2004) consisting 
of four major economies and nine Asian countries5 during the period of 2001-2014 
(pre-crisis period: 2001-2007, crisis period: 2008-2009 and post-crisis period: 
2010-2014). Their empirical results indicate that the spillover effect from China to 
the Asian stock markets has increased since the global financial crisis, although the 
level of its impact is still lower than those by the U.S. and Japan. They also report 
that the main driver of the spillover from the two major economies in the region 
(China and Japan) to other Asian stock markets is the trade linkage (the trade 
linkage for China and trade competition in third markets for Japan) rather than the 
financial linkage. 
 
3The bilateral factors refer to returns for these five countries in the asset markets; the global and sectoral 
factors include world market returns, global interest rates, oil prices, gold prices and commodity prices, and asset 
returns for 14 sectoral indexes. 
4The 12 Asian countries are Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.  
5These blocks are China, Japan, the euro area, and the U.S., and the nine sample countries are Australia, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. 
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In addition to these studies, other studies have examined interdependence in 
stock market returns between countries. Tavares (2009) examines 40 developed and 
emerging markets from the 1970s to 1990s, finding that the intensity of bilateral 
trade increases the correlations in stock market returns between countries, while 
real exchange rate volatility, asymmetry in output growth and dissimilarity in 
exports all decrease this correlation. Eiling and Gerard (2015) find that there are 
significant time trends in cross-country correlations in 32 emerging markets for the 
period from 1991 to 2009. They argue that official market liberalization, equity 
market openness, equity market development and trade openness drive these 
trends. Paramati et al. (2015; 2016) find that the degree of trade intensity drives 
stock market interdependence between Australia and its trading partners. 
The above-mentioned papers use aggregate and macro-level data. In contrast to 
these studies, our study uses industry-level data for an individual country. As there 
are cross-sectional variations as well as time-series variations in real and financial 
linkages across industries for an individual country, we can use such variations in 
order to examine comovements in stock returns between the individual country and 
foreign countries in more depth. 
The literature on stock return comovements and variations across countries using 
industry and/or firm level data can be traced back to Roll (1992), Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994), and Griffin and Karolyi (1998).  
Roll (1992) documents that industry factors such as differences or similarities in 
industrial compositions are the main factors explaining stock return correlations 
across countries. In his analysis, he uses daily stock indexes for 24 countries from 
April of 1988 to March of 1991. However, Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) argue 
that variations in the stock returns of countries are mainly due to country-specific 
factors rather than industry factors. Their sample includes 829 firms in 12 
European countries for the period of 1978 to 1992. Griffin and Karolyi (1998) find 
that the industry effect is greater for traded-goods industries than for nontraded-
goods industries in explaining stock return variations for 25 countries for the period 
of 1992 to 1995. 
More recently, Brooks and Del Negro (2006) and Faias and Ferreira (2016) 
explore international stock market commonality using firm-level data. Brooks and 
Del Negro (2006) analyze the relationship between international stock market 
return comovement and the degree of internationalization of firms such as firm’s 
international sales, assets and income as well as sector affiliation (traded versus 
non-traded). They use firm-level data composed of 1,239 firms in 20 developed 
and emerging countries for the period from 1985 to 2002. They find that the higher 
the degree of globalization of a firm, the higher the sensitivity of stock returns to 
global shocks, indicating that firms that operate internationally have stronger 
linkages with the global stock market. Faias and Ferreira (2016) find using monthly 
stock return data from 45 countries for the period from 2001 to 2010 that the 
degree of stock return variation is better explained by industry and global factors 
rather than country factors.   
There have also been several studies of the stock return comovements of Korean 
companies using firm-level data. Park (2007) examines the impacts of analysts and 
foreign investors on the synchronicity of stock returns between Korean individual 
firms and the market from 2000 to 2003, finding that the degree of synchronicity 
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becomes greater as the number of financial analysts following a firm increases, 
whereas the impact of foreign investors as measured by the foreign-owned equity 
share of the firm is not significant. The author argues that foreign investors rely on 
firm-specific financial information based on the firm’s intrinsic value rather than 
on market-wide information, whereas analysts provide investors with more market-
related information. Kim et al. (2015) and Cho and Mooney (2015) investigate the 
comovement of stock returns for firms belonging to business groups (known as 
chaebol) and its key determinants during the periods of 1980-2009 and 2002-2011, 
respectively. Both papers report that companies affiliated with business groups 
exhibit more salient comovements in stock returns with other companies in the 
same business group than with companies not affiliated with the business group. 
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
 
In the first stage of this paper, we measure comovements in stock returns 
between Korea and three countries—the U.S., Japan, and China—using stock 
returns at the industry level, and in the second stage, we examine what drives the 
comovements between Korea and the three countries. The three countries are 
chosen based on the fact that they are major trading partners of Korea. From 2003 
to 2016, Korea’s average proportion of trade with China (20.5%) was the highest, 
with the U.S. (11.0%), Japan (10.0%), Saudi Arabia (3.7%), Hong Kong (3.2%), 
and Taiwan (3.0%) following.6 We choose these three countries as major trading 
partners of Korea because each of their portions of trade with Korea exceeded 5% 
for the period.  
In the first stage, in order to measure the comovements in stock returns between 
Korea and the three countries at the industry level, we use two alternative 
specifications, denoted here as (1) and (2). 
 
(1)   ti,tChina,iChina,tJapan,iJapan,tus,ius,iti, εRβRβRβαR   
(2)   i,t i us,i us,t Japan,i Japan,t China,i China,t CRB,i CRB,t
USTN,i USTN,t VIX,i t CDS,i t i,t
R  α β R β R β R  β R
         β ΔY β ΔVIX β ΔCDS ε
    
     
In (1), i,tR  represents the return of industry i  during the week of t  for 
Korea. us,tR , Japan,tR  and China,tR  denote the market returns during week t  for 
U.S., Japan and China, respectively. In the first specification, we follow the spirit 
of the ICAPM, where the expected return of a country’s stock market is influenced 
by global stock market returns. We use the three market returns of major countries 
as proxies for global stock market returns. In (2), following Arslanalp et al. (2016), 
we add four control variables to the market returns of the U.S., Japan and China. 
 
6We compute the proportions of trade with foreign countries for Korea using data from the Bank of Korea 
(ECOS). 
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The four control variables are the returns computed by the CRB (Commodity 
Research Bureau) index ( CRB,tR ),7 changes in the yield of U.S. two-year Treasury 
notes ( USTN,tΔY ), changes in the VIX ( tΔVIX ), and changes in the CDS premium 
on Korea’s five-year bonds from week t-1 to week t . We collect the CRB index 
and VIX data from Bloomberg, the yield of U.S. two-year Treasury notes from the 
Federal Reserve Economic Data and the CDS premium on Korea’s five-year bonds 
from the Korea Center for International Finance. As the CDS premium is regularly 
available from 2003, we begin our sample period at that point. 
In our sample, we include Korean manufacturing companies for which stocks 
were traded for the period from 2003 to 2016. We compute weekly stock returns 
(Wednesday to Wednesday) for each of the stocks using their stock prices adjusted 
for any distribution to stockholders, such as stock splits and dividend payments. 
 
TABLE 1—KOREAN STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION (REVISION 9) FOR MANUFACTURING 
Division Code Name of Division 
10 Food products 
11 Beverages 
12 Tobacco products 
13 Textiles, except apparel 
14 Wearing apparel, clothing accessories and fur articles 
15 Tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage and footwear 
16 Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture 
17 Pulp, paper and paper products 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
19 Coke, hard-coal and lignite fuel briquettes and refined petroleum products 
20 Chemicals and chemical products, except pharmaceuticals and medicinal chemicals 
21 Pharmaceuticals, medical chemicals and botanical products 
22 Rubber and plastic products 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 
24 Basic metal products 
25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
26 Electronic components, computer, radio, television and  communication equipment and apparatuses 
27 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
28 Electrical equipment 
29 Other machinery and equipment 
30 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
31 Other transport equipment 
32 Furniture 
33 Other manufacturing 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office (Korean Standard Industrial Classification, 2008). 
  
 
7The CRB index is based on exchange-traded futures for 19 commodities and reflects price changes in 
commodity markets. (https://financial.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/financial/cc-crb-
total-return-index.pdf).  
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The adjusted stock prices are provided by DataGuide. We compute weekly 
value-weighted stock returns for each industry using all stock returns of individual 
companies included in the industry. We use the market capitalization of each stock 
in order to compute the value-weighted stock returns for the industry. The data on 
the industry to which each company belongs and the market capitalization of the 
company are also provided by DataGuide. For the classification of industries for 
Korea, we use the Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC, revision 9) 
provided by the Korea National Statistical Office. 8  There are 24 divisions 
(industries) for manufacturing in the KSIC (revision 9). Table 1 reports the codes 
and names for the 24 divisions (industries). For the U.S., Japan and China, we 
compute stock market returns using the stock market return index provided by 
Datastream. The stock market returns are also computed weekly (Wednesday to 
Wednesday) for the period from 2003 to 2016. All returns are computed in terms of 
local currencies.9 
In both (1) and (2), we run a regression for each year in our sample period and 
estimate the coefficients yearly in order to measure the comovements of stock 
returns for industry i  with respect to the U.S., Japan and China for the year. 
In the second stage, in order to examine what determines the comovements in 
stock returns between Korea and the three countries at the industry level, we use 
three main explanatory variables: (i) the ratio of trade to sales as a proxy for the 
trade linkage (ii) the proportion of foreign stock investment as a proxy for the 
financial linkage and (iii) export competition in third markets. In addition, we add a 
dummy variable for the period of the global financial crisis (2008-2009) following 
Arslanalp et al. (2016), as the stock returns between Korea and the three countries 
may comove more or less during the crisis. We also consider industry effects for 
Korea using 23 industry dummies. The ratios of trade to sales and export 
competition in third markets are computed yearly for each Korean manufacturing 
division (industry) for each of the three countries (the U.S., Japan and China). The 
proportion of foreign stock investment is computed for each such division 
(industry) for a given year. In the regression, we use the natural log of (1+ trade-
to-sales ratio ×100) and the natural log of (1+ proportion of foreign stock 
investment ×100). The specifications without the dummy variables for the second 
stage are expressed as follows: 
 
(3-1)   us,i us,i us,trade us,i us,finance i
us,xc us,i us,i
β δ   δ Trade δ Finance
        δ ExportCompetition  ε
  
   
 
8The KSIC, introduced in 1963, is based on the UN’s International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). 
There have been ten revisions since its introduction. The tenth revision went into effect in July of 2017. The ninth 
revision, which became effective in 2008, was the latest revision in our sample period. The KSIC has a 
hierarchical five-digit system. The KSIC (revision 9) was divided into 21 sections, and each section is broken 
down into divisions (denoted by two digits). The divisions are further broken down into groups (three digits), into 
classes (four digits) and then into subclasses (five digits). There were 76 divisions, 228 groups, 487 classes and 
1,145 subclasses for the KSIC (revision 9) (Source: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/ctryreg). 
9We also used the estimates of betas with the returns denominated in U.S dollars and obtained results 
qualitatively similar to the current results. . 
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(3-2)   Japan,i Japan,i Japan,trade Japan,i Japan,finance i
Japan,xc Japan,i Japan,i
β δ δ Trade δ Finance
            δ ExportCompetition  ε
  
   
(3-3)   China,i China,i China,trade China,i China,finance i
China,xc China,i China,i
β δ δ Trade δ Finance
            δ ExportCompetition  ε
  
   
Specifically, the ratio of trade to sales for industry i  for a certain year for each 
of the three countries ( us,iTrade , Japan,iTrade , and China,iTrade ) is computed as 
follows. We collect the annual exports and imports between Korea and each of the 
three countries in U.S. dollars from the UN Comtrade database at the level of HS 
6-digit codes under HS 1996. Next, we convert HS 6-digit codes under HS 1996 to 
HS 6-digit codes under HS 2002 using a correspondence table provided by the UN 
Statistics Division.10 Subsequently, we use two correspondence tables for the 2010 
Input-Output Statistics of Korea.11 The first is a correspondence table between the 
HS 6-digit codes under HS 2002 and I-O commodity codes for the 2010 Input-
Output Statistics of Korea. The second is a correspondence table between the I-O 
commodity codes and the KSIC (revision 9) codes. By combining the two 
correspondence tables, we convert HS 6-digit codes under HS 2002 to KSIC 
(revision 9) codes. Next, we sum up the annual trade for all of the HS 6-digit codes 
in each industry so that we can compute the annual trade for the industry. For the 
sales of each industry, we collect the annual sales in Korean won for each company 
within the industry from DataGuide and then compute the annual sales in Korean 
won for the industry by adding up the annual sales for all of the companies in the 
industry.12 We then divide the annual sales for the industry in Korean won by the 
average exchange rate between the Korean won and U.S. dollar for the year13 and 
thus compute the annual sales for the industry in U.S. dollars. Lastly, we compute 
the ratio of trade to sales using the annual trade and sales in U.S. dollars for the 
industry. 
For the proportion of foreign stock investment each year in a Korean industry, 
we determine the proportion of foreign stock investment for each company in the 
industry at the end of each month during the sample period using data from 
DataGuide and compute the value-weighted mean of the proportions for all of the 
companies in the industry at the end of the month. Next, we calculate the annual 
average of the monthly proportions for the industry. Following Arslanalp et al. 
(2016), we compute export competition in third markets for industry i  each year 
for each of the three countries ( us,iExportCompetition , Japan,iExportCompetition , 
and China,iExportCompetition ) as the minimum between the share of industry i  
out of all exports for Korea and that for each of the three countries. 
 
10https://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/classifications/correspondence-tables.asp 
11Bank of Korea (2014) 
12It is possible that sales data underestimate the actual amount of each industry to some degree because 
DataGuide does not include non-listed companies. 
13We collect the annual average exchange rates between the Korean won and U.S. dollar from the Bank of 
Korea (ECOS). 
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TABLE 2—TRADE-TO-SALES RATIO, PROPORTION OF FOREIGN STOCK INVESTMENT AND 
EXPORT COMPETITION FOR KOREA (AVERAGE FOR 24 MANUFACTURING DIVISIONS) 
Category Country 2003-2007 (A, %) 
2008-2009 
(B, %) 
2010-2016 
(C, %) (C-A, %p) 
Trade  
to Sales 
U.S. 39.7  28.2  26.4  -13.3  
Japan 45.7  34.7  27.9  -17.9  
China 53.4  68.0  72.1  18.7  
Foreign Stock 
Investment All countries 20.3  17.7  19.8  -0.5  
Export 
Competition 
U.S. 2.8 2.7 2.7 -0.1 
Japan 2.9 2.9 2.9 0.0 
China 2.8 2.8 2.8 0.0 
 
Table 2 reports the averages of the trade-to-sales ratio, the proportion of foreign 
stock investment and export competition for the 24 Korean manufacturing 
divisions before the global financial crisis (2003-2007), during the global financial 
crisis (2008-2009), and after the global financial crisis (2010-2016). The average of 
the trade-to-sales ratio for the U.S. decreased from 39.7% before the crisis to 
26.4% after the crisis. The average of the trade-to-sales ratio for Japan also 
decreased from 45.7% before the crisis to 27.9% after the crisis. On the other hand, 
the average of the trade-to-sales ratio for China increased from 53.4% before the 
crisis to 72.1% after the crisis. For the average proportion of foreign stock 
investment, it was 20.3% before the crisis and changed to 19.8% after the crisis. 
For export competition, the three countries have similar levels of competition with 
Korea and show little change over time. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the betas from specification (1), in this case the 
regression without control variables, in Section IV. Panel A in Table 3 provides the 
estimates of betas for the 24 Korean manufacturing divisions (industries) with 
respect to the U.S. and their averages for three sub-periods: before the global 
financial crisis (2003-2007), during the global financial crisis (2008-2009), and 
after the global financial crisis (2010-2016). For the U.S., the average betas before 
and after the global financial crisis are estimated to be 0.270 and 0.218, 
respectively. Moreover, the beta after the crisis is smaller than that before the crisis 
for 18 out of 24 divisions. Thus, we conclude that the comovement between the 
Korean and U.S. stock markets decreases over time. Interestingly, the average beta 
during the crisis was -0.163, and the beta was negative for 22 out of 24 divisions. 
This suggests that the Korean and U.S. stock markets moved in opposite directions 
during the crisis when controlling for the effects of the other two major markets, 
Japan and China. 
Panel B in Table 3 provides the estimates of the betas for the 24 Korean 
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manufacturing divisions (industries) with respect to Japan and their averages for 
the three sub-periods. For Japan, the average betas before and after the global 
financial crisis are estimated to be 0.365 and 0.114, respectively. In addition, the 
beta after the crisis is smaller than that before the crisis for 23 out of 24 divisions. 
Thus, the comovement between the Korean and Japanese stock markets also 
declines over time. The average beta during the crisis was 0.494, which suggests 
that the Korean and Japanese stock markets moved further in the same direction 
during the crisis. 
Panel C in Table 3 provides the estimates of the betas for the 24 Korean 
manufacturing divisions (industries) with respect to China and their averages for 
the three sub-periods. For China, the average betas before and after the global 
financial crisis are estimated to be 0.129 and 0.229, respectively. Furthermore, the 
beta after the crisis is larger than that before the crisis for 20 out of 24 divisions. 
 
TABLE 3—ESTIMATES OF BETAS FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT TO U.S., 
JAPANESE AND CHINESE STOCK MARKET RETURNS (WITHOUT CONTROL VARIABLES) 
[Panel A: U.S.] 
Industry 2003-2007 (A) 
2008-2009 
(B) 
2010-2016 
(C) (C-A) 
10 0.228  -0.143  0.025  -0.203  
11 0.192  -0.168  0.100  -0.092  
12 0.294  -0.081  0.153  -0.140  
13 0.061  -0.151  0.278  0.217  
14 0.310  -0.114  0.119  -0.191  
15 -0.006  -0.316  0.543  0.549  
16 0.397  -0.030  0.225  -0.171  
17 0.259  -0.233  0.194  -0.065  
18 0.666  0.040  0.232  -0.434  
19 0.273  -0.029  0.257  -0.016  
20 0.402  -0.087  0.259  -0.143  
21 0.226  -0.220  -0.061  -0.288  
22 0.217  -0.155  0.286  0.070  
23 0.213  -0.287  0.214  0.002  
24 0.334  0.265  0.289  -0.046  
25 0.164  -0.440  0.412  0.248  
26 0.265  -0.011  0.202  -0.063  
27 0.462  -0.336  0.230  -0.231  
28 0.400  -0.135  0.231  -0.169  
29 0.375  -0.350  0.337  -0.038  
30 0.166  -0.173  0.104  -0.062  
31 0.147  -0.225  0.381  0.234  
32 0.326  -0.080  0.122  -0.204  
33 0.110  -0.446  0.089  -0.021  
Average 0.270  -0.163  0.218  -0.052  
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TABLE 3—ESTIMATES OF BETAS FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT TO U.S., 
JAPANESE AND CHINESE STOCK MARKET RETURNS (WITHOUT CONTROL VARIABLES) (CONTINUED) 
[Panel B: Japan] 
Industry 2003-2007 (A) 
2008-2009 
(B) 
2010-2016 
(C) (C-A) 
10 0.322  0.306  0.133  -0.189  
11 0.329  0.116  0.116  -0.213  
12 0.039  0.168  0.012  -0.026  
13 0.323  0.403  0.158  -0.165  
14 0.303  0.284  0.226  -0.077  
15 0.278  0.199  0.059  -0.218  
16 0.271  1.037  0.153  -0.118  
17 0.134  0.483  0.058  -0.075  
18 0.172  0.556  0.073  -0.099  
19 0.170  0.296  -0.080  -0.249  
20 0.388  0.517  0.053  -0.335  
21 0.269  0.440  0.272  0.003  
22 0.405  0.580  0.118  -0.287  
23 0.426  0.636  0.115  -0.311  
24 0.711  0.454  0.030  -0.681  
25 0.414  0.744  0.126  -0.288  
26 0.614  0.487  0.277  -0.338  
27 0.391  0.655  0.104  -0.287  
28 0.354  0.604  0.103  -0.251  
29 0.569  0.788  0.184  -0.385  
30 0.715  0.437  -0.015  -0.729  
31 0.545  0.722  0.195  -0.350  
32 0.198  0.201  0.061  -0.136  
33 0.424  0.754  0.197  -0.227  
Average 0.365  0.494  0.114  -0.251  
 
  
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SID
ab
cd
ef_
:M
S_
00
01
MS
_0
00
1
VOL. 40 NO.1   What Drives the Stock Market Comovements between Korea and China, Japan and the U.S.?  59 
TABLE 3—ESTIMATES OF BETAS FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT TO U.S., 
JAPANESE AND CHINESE STOCK MARKET RETURNS (WITHOUT CONTROL VARIABLES) (CONTINUED) 
[Panel C: China] 
Industry 2003-2007 (A) 
2008-2009 
(B) 
2010-2016 
(C) (C-A) 
10 0.102  0.205  0.053  -0.049  
11 0.138  0.207  0.060  -0.078  
12 -0.042  0.021  -0.003  0.039  
13 0.162  0.215  0.130  -0.032  
14 0.061  0.280  0.060  -0.001  
15 0.043  0.512  0.120  0.077  
16 0.030  0.286  0.201  0.171  
17 0.038  0.224  0.179  0.141  
18 0.105  -0.129  0.210  0.105  
19 0.239  0.251  0.578  0.339  
20 0.255  0.222  0.392  0.138  
21 0.113  0.244  0.117  0.004  
22 0.129  0.181  0.170  0.041  
23 0.145  0.312  0.213  0.069  
24 0.226  0.421  0.440  0.214  
25 0.130  0.387  0.240  0.110  
26 0.191  0.066  0.330  0.138  
27 0.111  0.363  0.264  0.154  
28 0.137  0.067  0.278  0.141  
29 0.166  0.466  0.304  0.138  
30 0.183  0.224  0.348  0.165  
31 0.267  0.556  0.419  0.152  
32 0.109  0.154  0.139  0.029  
33 0.062  0.232  0.247  0.185  
Average 0.129  0.249  0.229  0.100  
 
Thus, we conclude that the comovement between Korean and Chinese stock 
markets increases over time. The average beta during the crisis was 0.249. This 
suggests that the Korean and Chinese stock markets moved further in the same 
direction during the crisis. 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the betas from specification (2), in this case 
regression with control variables, in Section IV. Panel A in Table 4 provides the 
estimates of the betas for the 24 Korean manufacturing divisions (industries) with 
respect to the U.S. and their averages for the three sub-periods. For the U.S., the 
average betas before and after the global financial crisis are estimated to be 0.479 
and 0.006, respectively. In addition, the beta after the crisis is smaller than that 
before the crisis for 21 out of 24 divisions. Panel B in Table 4 provides the 
estimates of the betas for the 24 Korean manufacturing divisions (industries) with 
respect to Japan and their averages for the three sub-periods. For Japan, the average 
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betas before and after the global financial crisis are estimated to be 0.304 and 
0.124, respectively. The beta after the crisis is smaller than that before the crisis for 
20 out of 24 divisions. Panel C in Table 4 provides the estimates of the betas for the 
24 Korean manufacturing divisions (industries) with respect to China and their 
averages for the three sub-periods. For China, the average betas before and after the 
global financial crisis are estimated to be 0.112 and 0.192, respectively. In addition, 
the beta after the crisis is larger than that before the crisis for 19 out of 24 divisions. 
By industry, the increase in the value of beta was especially significant in divisions 
19 (0.270), 24 (0.231) and 30 (0.182). 
When we look at the post-crisis period (2010-2016) in terms of specific Korean 
industries, the estimated beta with regard to China was the highest in division 19 
(0.533), followed by divisions 24 (0.396), 30 (0.344), 20 (0.338), 31 (0.331) and 26 
(0.320). The betas in divisions 19 (0.410), 31 (0.406), 22 (0.255) and 30 (0.254) were 
 
 
TABLE 4—ESTIMATES OF BETAS FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT TO U.S., 
JAPANESE AND CHINESE STOCK MARKET RETURNS (WITH CONTROL VARIABLES) 
[Panel A: U.S.] 
Industry 2003-2007 (A) 
2008-2009 
(B) 
2010-2016 
(C) (C-A) 
10 0.300  -0.301 -0.204 -0.504 
11 0.087  -0.401 -0.161 -0.248 
12 0.300  -0.217 0.071 -0.229 
13 0.378  -0.084 -0.144 -0.522 
14 0.460  0.004 -0.136 -0.596 
15 0.272  0.177 0.201 -0.071 
16 0.711  -0.056 -0.352 -1.063 
17 0.429  -0.086 0.044 -0.474 
18 1.662  0.310 -0.112 -1.774 
19 0.265  -0.141 0.410 0.145 
20 0.581  0.108 0.169 -0.412 
21 0.389 -0.085 -0.249 -0.638 
22 0.283 0.110 0.255 -0.029 
23 0.167 -0.274 0.031 -0.136 
24 0.775 0.453 -0.040 -0.815 
25 0.466 -0.310 0.030 -0.436 
26 0.584 0.349 0.134 -0.450 
27 1.036 -0.104 -0.214 -1.250 
28 0.620 0.179 0.026 -0.594 
29 0.743 0.110 0.179 -0.564 
30 0.078 0.762 0.254 0.176 
31 0.091 0.260 0.406 0.315 
32 0.410 -0.151 -0.160 -0.570 
33 0.407 -0.539 -0.197 -0.604 
Average 0.479 0.003 0.006 -0.473 
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TABLE 4—ESTIMATES OF BETAS FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT TO U.S., 
JAPANESE AND CHINESE STOCK MARKET RETURNS (WITH CONTROL VARIABLES) (CONTINUED) 
[Panel B: Japan] 
Industry 2003-2007 (A) 
2008-2009 
(B) 
2010-2016 
(C) (C-A) 
10 0.265  0.169  0.140  -0.125  
11 0.247  0.051  0.171  -0.076  
12 0.057  0.184  0.060  0.003  
13 0.295  0.227  0.150  -0.145  
14 0.163  0.088  0.192  0.029  
15 0.299  -0.087  0.036  -0.263  
16 0.223  0.689  0.198  -0.025  
17 0.059  0.361  0.082  0.023  
18 0.130  0.519  0.060  -0.070  
19 0.116  0.134  -0.051  -0.167  
20 0.276  0.313  0.081  -0.195  
21 0.202  0.457  0.327  0.125  
22 0.367  0.312  0.121  -0.246  
23 0.379  0.476  0.123  -0.256  
24 0.578  0.149  0.080  -0.499  
25 0.321  0.398  0.145  -0.176  
26 0.587  0.317  0.255  -0.332  
27 0.362  0.491  0.070  -0.291  
28 0.282  0.434  0.100  -0.183  
29 0.500  0.512  0.183  -0.317  
30 0.656  0.040  -0.028  -0.684  
31 0.420  0.309  0.232  -0.188  
32 0.182  0.185  0.058  -0.124  
33 0.336  0.545  0.189  -0.148  
Average 0.304  0.303  0.124  -0.180  
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TABLE 4—ESTIMATES OF BETAS FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT TO U.S., 
JAPANESE AND CHINESE STOCK MARKET RETURNS (WITH CONTROL VARIABLES) (CONTINUED) 
[Panel C: China] 
Industry 2003-2007 (A) 
2008-2009 
(B) 
2010-2016 
(C) (C-A) 
10 0.083  0.096  0.041  -0.043  
11 0.130  0.163  0.016  -0.114  
12 -0.033  -0.032  -0.001  0.032  
13 0.169  0.065  0.107  -0.061  
14 0.033  0.125  -0.023  -0.055  
15 0.042  0.396  0.058  0.016  
16 -0.017  0.101  0.147  0.164  
17 0.008  0.150  0.141  0.133  
18 0.097  -0.155  0.140  0.043  
19 0.263  0.149  0.533  0.270  
20 0.209  0.142  0.338  0.129  
21 0.126  0.174  0.110  -0.016  
22 0.112  0.035  0.157  0.045  
23 0.106  0.191  0.166  0.060  
24 0.165  0.348  0.396  0.231  
25 0.112  0.235  0.188  0.076  
26 0.186  -0.007  0.320  0.135  
27 0.081  0.228  0.231  0.150  
28 0.107  0.000  0.278  0.171  
29 0.131  0.380  0.270  0.139  
30 0.162  0.173  0.344  0.182  
31 0.272  0.411  0.331  0.059  
32 0.086  0.142  0.114  0.029  
33 0.048  0.055  0.212  0.163  
Average 0.112  0.149  0.192  0.081  
 
the highest with respect to the U.S.. In the case of Japan, the betas in divisions 21 
(0.327), 26 (0.255) and 31 (0.232) were the highest.  
Thus, together with the results from Table 3 and Table 4, we conclude that the 
comovements in stock returns between Korea and the U.S. and between Korea and 
Japan decline over time. In contrast, the comovement in stock returns between 
Korea and China increases over time. 
Table 5 reports the results of a regression analysis where we examine the drivers 
of comovements in stock returns between Korea and the three countries. In Panel A 
of Table 5, we use the betas for the 24 Korean manufacturing divisions (industries) 
with respect to the U.S. from specifications (1) and (2) in Section IV, i.e., 
regression without and with control variables, as dependent variables. When we use 
the beta from specification (1), i.e., without control variables, as a dependent 
variable, and the variables of trade flows, foreign stock investment and export 
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competition in third markets as independent variables, the variable of trade is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, but the variables of foreign stock 
investment and export competition are not significant at any conventional level. 
When we add a dummy variable for the global financial crisis, none of the three 
variables is significant. When we use the beta from specification (2), i.e., with 
control variables, as a dependent variable, the variable of trade is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, whereas the variables of foreign stock investment and 
export competition are not statistically significant. When we add a dummy variable 
for the global financial crisis, the variable of trade is still positive and significant at 
the 5% level. However, the variables of foreign stock investment and export 
competition are not significant. Thus, for the U.S., we conclude that the variable of 
trade has a positive relationship with beta, but the variables of foreign stock 
investment and export competition show no relationship with beta. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we use the betas for the 24 Korean manufacturing 
divisions (industries) with respect to Japan from specifications (1) and (2) as 
dependent variables. When we use the beta from specification (1) as a dependent 
variable, the variable of trade is positive and significant at the 1% level, but the 
variables of foreign stock investment and export competition are not significant. 
When we add a dummy variable for the global financial crisis, the variable of trade 
is still positive and significant at the 1% level, but the variables of foreign stock 
investment and export competition are not significant. When we use the beta from 
specification (2) as a dependent variable and variables of trade and foreign stock 
investment as independent variables, the variable of trade is still positive and 
significant at the 5% level, but the variables of foreign stock investment and export 
competition are not significant. When we add a dummy variable for the global 
financial crisis, the variable of trade is still positive and significant at the 5% level. 
However, the variables of foreign stock investment and export competition are not 
significant. Thus, in the case of Japan, we conclude that the variable of trade has a 
positive relationship with beta, whereas the variables of foreign stock investment 
and export competition are unrelated to beta.  
In Panel C of Table 5, we use the betas for the 24 Korean manufacturing 
divisions (industries) with respect to China from specifications (1) and (2) as 
dependent variables. When we use the beta from specification (1) as a dependent 
variable, the variable of trade is positive and significant at the 1% level, but the 
variables of foreign stock investment and export competition are not statistically 
significant. When we add a dummy variable to represent the global financial crisis, 
the variable of trade is still positive and significant at the 1% level, but the 
variables of foreign stock investment and export competition are not significant. 
When we use the beta from specification (2) as a dependent variable, the variable 
of trade remains positive and significant at the 10% level, but the variables of 
foreign stock investment and export competition are not significant. When we add 
a dummy variable for the global financial crisis, the variable of trade is still 
positive and significant at the 10% level. However, the variables of foreign stock 
investment and export competition are not significant. Therefore, for China, we 
conclude that the variable of trade is positively related to beta but that the variables 
of foreign stock investment and export competition are not. 
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TABLE 5—REGRESSION OF BETA ON TRADE, FOREIGN STOCK INVESTMENT AND 
EXPORT COMPETITION FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
[Panel A: U.S.] 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable 
 Beta of the Korean Manufacturing Industry 
 Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
Trade 
 0.161** 
(2.11) 
0.082 
(1.12) 
0.335** 
(2.44) 
0.301** 
(2.20) 
Finance 
 0.007 
(0.09) 
-0.031 
(-0.45) 
-0.068 
(-0.63) 
-0.084 
(-0.78) 
Export Competition 
 -0.009 
(-0.34) 
-0.006 
(-0.24) 
-0.008 
(-0.18) 
-0.006 
(-0.15) 
Crisis Dummy 
 
 -0.395*** (-7.55)  
-0.169** 
(-2.17) 
Industry Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  336 336 336 336 
R2  0.054 0.166 0.079 0.087 
 
[Panel B: Japan] 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable 
 Beta of the Korean Manufacturing Industry 
 Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
Trade 
 0.225*** 
(3.70) 
0.230*** 
(4.02) 
0.123** 
(2.10) 
0.128** 
(2.17) 
Finance 
 0.057 
(0.95) 
0.074 
(1.35) 
0.022 
(0.41) 
0.029 
(0.55) 
Export Competition 
 -0.012 
(-0.72) 
-0.010 
(-0.63) 
0.005 
(0.28) 
0.006 
(0.33) 
Crisis Dummy 
 
 0.279*** (7.10)  
0.105*** 
(2.73) 
Industry Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  336 336 336 336 
R2  0.143 0.240 0.102 0.118 
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. 2) ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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TABLE 5—REGRESSION OF BETA ON TRADE, FOREIGN STOCK INVESTMENT AND 
EXPORT COMPETITION FOR THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (CONTINUED) 
[Panel C: China] 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable 
 Beta of the Korean Manufacturing Industry 
 Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
Trade 
 0.134*** 
(3.11) 
0.132*** 
(2.98) 
0.087* 
(1.95) 
0.087* 
(1.96) 
Finance 
 0.019 
(0.70) 
0.022 
(0.83) 
0.023 
(0.77) 
0.022 
(0.75) 
Export Competition 
 -0.014 
(-1.06) 
-0.013 
(-1.03) 
-0.004 
(-0.32) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
Crisis Dummy 
 
 0.060 (1.69)  
-0.011 
(-0.33) 
Industry Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  336 336 336 336 
R2  0.239 0.248 0.212 0.212 
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. 2) ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Together with the results for the U.S., Japan and China, we conclude that the 
trade linkage is the main driver of comovements in stock returns between Korea 
and the three major countries. We find no evidence that either the financial linkage 
proxied by foreign stock investment or export competition is related to 
comovements in stock returns between Korea and the three countries. However, we 
admit that the proxy used for measuring the bilateral financial linkage between 
Korea and the three countries in our paper may have some limitations if used to 
explain the interconnection. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper measures the extent of comovements in stock returns between Korea 
and three major countries (China, Japan and the U.S.) using industry-level data for 
Korea from 2003 to 2016, in the spirit of the ICAPM. It also examines what drives 
the comovements between Korea and the three countries. 
From our analysis, we find that the comovements of the Korean stock market 
with those of the U.S. and Japan decline after the global financial crisis. In contrast, 
the post-crisis comovement in stock returns between Korea and China is greater 
than that during the pre-crisis period. 
Next, we examine the drivers of comovements in stock returns between Korea 
and the three countries. Specifically, we use betas for 24 Korean manufacturing 
divisions (industries) with respect to the U.S., Japan and China as dependent 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SID
ab
cd
ef_
:M
S_
00
01
MS
_0
00
1
66 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2018 
variables and variables of trade and foreign stock investment as independent 
variables in an effort to examine whether either the trade or financial linkage 
between Korea and the three countries can explain the degrees of comovements in 
stock returns between Korea and the three countries. From our analysis, we find 
that the trade linkage is the main driver of comovements in stock returns between 
Korea and the three countries. On the other hand, we find no evidence that the 
financial linkage proxied by foreign stock investment is related to comovements in 
stock returns between Korea and the three countries. 
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